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COMMENTS
It should be noted that the significance of the present posi-
tion taken by the circuit courts in denying applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agree-
ments is lessened because of the fact that there are corhpara-
tively few breaches between labor and management of agree-
ments to arbitrate and the fact that the courts will award
damages for such breaches.
William A. L. Crowe
Torts-Recovery by Aggressor for Personal
Injuries Received in Encounter
Article 23151 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 is the
general tort article, and as such is the ultimate foundation of
the action wherein a party seeks recovery for personal injuries
received in an encounter with a fellow. Because of this, article
recovery is predicated upon the finding of "fault." Thus, for
example, in LaFleur v. Dupre2 plaintiff, when held "not at
fault," 3 was allowed damages, and in Fontenefle v. Waguespack4
it was concluded that "Either plaintiff or defendant, in order to
recover, would have to prove that he was without fault in pro-
voking the difficulty." 5 In the dissenting opinion in Ogden v.
Thomas6 the plaintiff was held not entitled to recovery because he
was not "without fault." 7 Nevertheless the number of cases
wherein "fault" is mentioned is quite restricted, the probable rea-
son for this being the formulation by the courts of what might
appropriately be called the "aggressor rule." 8
The "aggressor rule" is: One who provokes a difficulty
with another cannot recover damages for injuries inflicted upon
him as a result thereof, even though the conduct of the one who
1. "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another, obliges
him by whose fault it happened to repair it.
2. 41 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1949).
3. Id. at 720.
4. 1 La. App. 230 (1924).
5. Id. at 232.
6. 150 La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922).
7. 150 La. 316, 320, 90 So. 662, 663.
8. The "aggressor rule" itself received a "fault" transfusion in Randall v.
Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939), wherein the court stated: ". . . one who
is himself in fault cannot recover damages for a wrong resulting from such
fault, although the party inflicting the injury was not justified under the law."
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inflicts the injuries Was not justified in law.9 Virtually every
case on the subject cites this rule and it may be considered well
settled.
There are, however, deviations from the rule. The cases
usually relied upon, by counsel who challenge the rule are
Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Company"' and Randall v. Ridgley.11
In the Oakes case the manager gruffly addressed Oakes, a dis-
charged employee. Oakes cursed the manager, whereupon the
latter seized Oakes by the nape of the neck, carried him out to
the loading platform and kicked him off, plaintiff being injured
by the kick. The court cited the rule and several paragraphs
later stated, "Under no theory can it be said that defendant
was warranted in using any greater force than was necessary
in ejecting plaintiff from the premises." 12 This language is
contrary to the aggressor rule. The courts have construed this
decision in various ways. The first circuit court of appeal held
in Esnault v. Richard1" that even though the reasonableness of
the force was considered by the court in the Oakes case, that
court also stated that the aggressor rule was well settled.
1 4
In Bacas v. Laswell 5 the Orleans court of appeal held that
the Oakes case did not announce a new principle of law, that
case merely holding that "where plaintiff and defendant are
equally guilty of fault in provoking a difficulty, plaintiff is not
to be regarded as the aggressor and that defendant is liable in
damages where he uses undue force not justified by the occa-
sion." 16 It is submitted that if the court in the Oakes case had
held as the court in Bacas v. Laswell said it did, then a new
and somewhat contradictory principle of law would have been
announced.'7 However, the supreme court, in the Oakes case,
9. Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710 (1876); Johns v. Brinker, 30 La.
Ann. 241 (1878); Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886); Miller v. Meche,
111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903); Massett v. Keff, 116 La. 1107, 41 So. 330 (1906);
Bonneval v. American Coffee Co., 127 La. 57, 53 So. 426 (1910); Fontenelle v.
Waguespack, 150 La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922); Lide v. Parker, 6 La. App. 648
(1927).
10. 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932).
11. 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939).
12. 174 La. 770, 774, 141 So. 456, 457 (1932).
13. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
14. For the precise language of the court, see id. at 501.
15. 22 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 1945).
16. Id. at 594.
17. Even though the court states that the situation is one where both
parties are equally at fault, its subsequent language does not support that
conclusion. "Defendant is liable in damages where he uses undue force not
justified by the occasion" is pregnant with the converse that there is due
force which the defendant could use and be justified. If defendant could
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can be said to have given full effect to the "aggressor rule" in
holding the initial encounter to have terminated, and that defen-
dant was liable for force in the new undertaking, that is, for
kicking plaintiff off the loading platform.18
In Randall v. Ridgley the plaintiff, after having been put
out of defendant's bar for being disorderly, remained in an
adjacent parking lot and cursed Ridgley, who fired a revolver
either at Ridgley or to scare him, the bullet striking Ridgley
in his private parts. The court, after stating the aggressor rule
in essence, held "the use of firearms in this situation was unwar-
ranted" 19 and defendant was cast in judgment.20
Bacas v. Laswell held that the Randall case, as well as the
Oakes case, announced no new principle of law. That same
court, however, in Wade v. Gennaro,21 decided three years
earlier, acknowledged that the Randall case followed a rule of
law 22 diametrically opposite the "aggressor rule." It is submitted
that the Randall case is not in harmony with the body of the
jurisprudence; but its treatment in later cases compels the
conclusion that no new line of jurisprudence will start there-
from.
Two cases contain statements from which one might infer
justifiably use some force, then he could not in the beginning be equally at
fault with plaintiff. Only the plaintiff's action in this fact situation could
justify defendant's action against him, and that is provocation by plaintiff,
making plaintiff the aggressor and this calls the "aggressor rule" into opera-
tion, relieving defendant of any liability even though the force is unjustified.
But the court approves the rule that defendant would be liable, thus chang-
ing the rule. This same court in Patterson v. Kuntz, 28 So. 2d 278 (La. App.
1946), reaffirmed the position taken in Bacas v. Laswell that the aggressor
rule will not be applied when there is mutual fault respecting the difficulty
where the defendant uses undue force (such as a dangerous weapon) not
justified by the occasion.
18. This view is supported by the language which the writer believes to
be the ratio decidendi. "But, if it be conceded that plaintiff was at fault,
and that Goldenberg had ample provocation for physically ejecting him from
the premises, the final assault, the 'parting kick,' which was inflicted out on
the platform, after plaintiff had been put out of. the building, was not
necessary and wholly unjustified." 174 La. 770, 773, 141 So. 456, 457 (1932).
19. 185 So. 632, 633 (La. App. 1939).
20. In support of its conclusion the court cited American Jurisprudence,
Vol. 4, verbo "Assault and Battery," 153, § 51.
21. 8 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1942)'
22. "Counsel for plaintiff recognizes the effect of these authorities, but
contends that the present case is one which is controlled by the principle
that 'a person defending himself from an attack becomes liable as an
aggressor where the force employed is in excess of that which the law will
tolerate in a given case for defensive purposes, and for the use of such
excessive force he is liable both civilly and criminally.'
"In the Randall case we reached the conclusion that the latter principle
of law applied." Id. at 562.
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that the "aggressor rule" is not settled. In Ponthieu v. Coco93
the rule was referred to as "majority jurisprudence of this
State," 24 and the court in Esnault v. Richard25 was of the opin-
ion that it "should strictly adhere to the old line of jurispru-
dence until it is changed." 26
There are a number of cases which, although espousing the
rule, for no apparent reason fail to follow it. Thus in Landry v.
Hime 27 the fact that only "reasonably necessary" 28 force was
used was determinative, and in Newman v. Southern Kraft Cor-
poration 29 recovery was allowed when the "force used was
excessive and unnecessary under the circumstances." 30 In
McCurdy v. City Cab Company3 1 the court considered as decisive
the answer to the question "If Sullivan was not the aggressor,
did he emplo more force than was necessary, under the cir-
cumstances, to protect himself . . . ?" 82 In Stoehr v. Payne
33
"unnecessary brutality . . . was wholly inexcusable" 34 and per-
mitted plaintiff recovery. An "unprovoked, ferocious, and inex-
cusable" 35 attack in McVoy v. Ellis 6 was the basis of recovery
and even when on rehearing the court concluded that the attack
was provoked, damages were merely diminished. One case
3 7
indicated that certain kinds of aggressors can recover. And even
when defendant "might be considered" 38 the aggressor because
he got a shotgun and sought out plaintiff's deceased husband,
plaintiff did not prevail.
Perhaps the most usual way in which the courts contradict
their professed adherence to the rule is in seeking "justification"
for the acts of the aggressed, whereas the "rule" denies recovery
23. 18 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1944).
24. Id. at 356.
25. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
26. Id. at 503.
27. 176 So. 627 (La. App. 1937).
28. Id. at 629.
29. 197 So. 197 (La. App. 1940).
30. Id. at 199. The strength of this holding on' this particular point may
be weakened by the court's simultaneous application of the "aggressor rule"
and the "trespasser-owner doctrine."
31. 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947).
32. Id. at 721.
33. 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 604 (1913).
34. 132 La. 213, 220, 61 So. 206, 209, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 604, 607.
35. 148 La. 247, 250, 86 So. 783, 784 (1921).
36. Ibid.
37. Newman v. Southern Kraft Corp., 197 So. 197 (La. App. 1940): ".
plaintiff was not an aggressor such as would bar his recovery of .damages."
Id. at 199.
38. Esnault v. Richard, 53 So. 2d 494, 502 (La. App. 1951).
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even though the force used is unjustified. Thus, plaintiff's
"obnoxious" 39 conduct in Ogden v. Thomas 40 did not "justify" 41
defendant's subsequent acts; and the crux of the problem pre-
sented in Conley v. Travelers Insurance Company42 was found,
said the court, in the answer to this question: "Was the plain-
tiff employee guilty of such words or actions as would be
expected to provoke justified physical retaliation by a fellow
employee?" 43 (Italics supplied.) Similarly lack of "sufficient
provocation to justify defendant in the eyes of the law" 4 per-
mitted plaintiff to recover in Antley v. Davis.4 5 Other cases46
make similar findings, though the search for justification is not
so pronounced.
An interesting confusion is created when the aggressor rule
is applied simultaneously with other rules of law. In Sheppard v.
Causey47 a tacit joinder of the trespasser-owner rule" and the
aggressor rule restricted the aggressed to "only the force neces-
sary" 49 in putting the aggressor out of the store. The same com-
bination in Young v. Broussard50 limited the force so as not to
"exceed the necessities and circumstances of the situation." "I
A subtle infusion of the trespasser-owner rule in Wade v. Gen-
naro 5 2 permitted the proprietor of a barroom to escape liability
for shooting deceased because deceased was hurling bricks at the
39. 41 So. 2d 717, 718 (La. App. 1949).
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 718.
42. 53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1951).
43. Id. at 683.
44. 199 So. 450 (La. App. 1940).
45. Ibid.
46. Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886) ("not justifiable," id. at
269); Bernard v. Kelley, 118 La. 132, 42 So. 723 (1907) ("defendant was not
justified in striking a witness in open court," 118 La. 132, 136, 42 So. 723, 725);
Burnecke v. O'Neal, 139 La. 208, 71 So. 395 (1916) ("it was not suflcient to
have justified defendant in beating plaintiff in the way that he beat him,"
139 La. 208, 210, 71 So. 395, 396); McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783 (1921)
("not justification," 148 La. 247, 253, 86 So. 783, 785); Oakes v. H. Weil Baking
Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932) ("not necessary and wholly unjustified,"
174 La. 770, 774, 141 So. 456, 457); Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477 (La. App.
1939) ("could not justify the shooting," id. at 481); Randall v. Ridgley, 185
So. 632,(La. App. 1939) ("unwarranted" and "not justified," id. at 633); Wade
v. Gennaro, 8 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1942) ("defendant was justified in killing
the deceased negro," id. at 562).
47. 8 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1942).
48. A lawful owner or occupant of property may use such force as may
be reasonably necessary to prevent an unlawful entry thereon or to remove
trespassers or intruders therefrom.
49. Id. at 95.
50. 189 So. 477 (La. App. 1939).
51. Id. at 481.
52. 8 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1942).
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barroom.53 In Newman v. Southern Kraft Corporation54 the
"aggressor rule" was subordinated when the court held "His
ejection from the premises could have been accomplished in a
manner less severe than that used," 15 and plaintiff received dam-
ages. The court in Patterson v. Kuntz5" reached its conclusion
after the influence of three rules had been felt: (1) aggressor
rule, (2) trespasser-owner rule, and (3) the rule that a defendant
using force under a reasonable apprehension of danger is not
civilly liable to one whom he has cause to believe is his assailant
though it subsequently appears that he is mistaken. The aggres-
sor rule was not specifically disposed of by the court, but it may
be inferred that the rule was held inapplicable, both parties
being held equally at fault.57 The third rule was deemed con-
trolling.
None of these cases have expressly subordinated the aggressor
rule to another rule, but attention is called to the possibility of
circumventing the former rule by invoking another.
The problem of determining who is the aggressor or what
constitutes aggression is one which encompasses many factors.
It is the purpose of the remainder of this article to isolate those
factors and to treat each one in detail insofar as the jurisprudence
permits. This is essentially an artificial process, because in each
case any number of these factors may have contributed to the
court's decision; but because it is believed that such a delineation
may be of value to practitioners having cases including only
certain of these factors, such an approach is utilized.
TERMINATION OF DIFFICULTY
There are certain acts which are clearly aggressive, but
which do not prevent recovery because of the termination of
53. "He was not obliged to witness the destruction of his property with-
out attempting to prevent it." Id. at 562.
54. 197 So. 197 (La. App. 1940).
55. Id. at 199.
56. 28 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 1946), noted in 22 Tulane L. Rev. 349 (1947).
57. The writer believes that the rule of law which denies the application
of the aggressor rule when both parties are equally at fault is an unneces-
sary complication of the rule. Pretermitting those cases where the conflict is
mutually premeditated, the conclusion that both parties are equally at fault
Is merely a conclusion, and as such is arrived at only after deciding that
certain acts of one party are not sufficient provocation for the acts of the
opponent, and those reciprocal acts of the opponent are not sufficient provo-
cation for the acts of the first party. But by merely holding that neither
party "provoked" the difficulty, which indeed is true in these situations, the
aggressor rule is ipso facto inapplicable. In those cases where the conflict
is mutually premeditated, provocation certainly could not be found.
474 ' [VOL. XII
COMMENTS
that difficulty and the onset of a new one, wherein the injury is
sustained. It is difficult to reconcile all the cases on the requisites
for termination. In Starnes v. Monsour's No. 418 the "bouncer"
told plaintiff that he would be put out for mooching; plaintiff
called him a "G-- d--- liar" and immediately after the exchange
plaintiff sat at a table. The bouncer pulled plaintiff from his chair
and ejected him. The court held that the question of who was
the aggressor had virtually passed from the case, since plaintiff
had certainly "evinced a disposition on his part to withdraw
from the unpleasantness." 59 It was held in Conley v. Travelers
Insurance Company60 that a morning cursing of another by plain-
tiff was definitely terminated at the noon hour when a second
encounter occurred. The court in Smith v. New Orleans Public
Service, Incorporated,"' concluded that the initial episode, in
which plaintiff had forced his way into the streetcar and past
the conductor, was terminated when plaintiff proceeded to remove
a screen with which to assault the conductor and was struck by
the latter. In Chisholm v. DeFrancis6 2 plaintiff attempted to
deliver some sandwiches but received no reply when knocking;
he walked to the window and addressed the men on the inside
in an offensive manner and was told to return the sandwiches to
the restaurant, to which he agreed and turned away. The court
held the incident was closed at this point insofar as plaintiff was
concerned, and defendant was held liable for coming out of the
house and striking plaintiff. In Ogden v. Thomas 68 plaintiff, after
insulting defendant's wife, left defendant's cafe and crossed the
street; defendant walked across the street and hit plaintiff with
a bottle. The court held that the previous difficulty was ter-
minated before defendant's attack. The facts in Young v. Brous-
sard64 were: Deceased was encountered by a watchman three
times and put out each time, twice peacefully and the third time
after an altercation. After putting deceased out the third time,
defendant took twenty steps inside the building from the door,
turned and saw a shadow at the door, and events transpired in
which decedent was killed. Twenty steps was the measure of
termination here. The court held that the previous difficulty had
58. 30 So. 2d 135 (La. App. 1947).
59. Id. at 138.
60. 53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1951).
61. 127 So. 16 (La. App. 1930).
62. 27 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 1946).
63. 41 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1949).
64. 189 So. 477 (La. App. 1939).
1952]
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"ceased, or at least became of no great importance," 65 saying in
effect that even an abating of the prior difficulty renders a defen-
dant liable for excessive force. This is an extension of those
cases permitting recovery when the prior difficulty had ter-
minated. There are a number of cases in which the court does
not expressly consider termination, but wherein it is apparent
that that factor was influential.66
OVERT ACT
The contention that there must be an overt act if aggression
be found was expressly made in Esnault v. Richard"7 and rejected
with the statement that "we should strictly adhere to the old line
of jurisprudence." 68 The court apparently was of the opinion
that the "old line of jurisprudence" held that aggression can be
found without there being an overt act. Although there is lan-
guage in some cases to the contrary, the opinion has much author-
ity in support of it.0 9 It was held in Walsh v. Schriner7° that it is
not "essential to exonerate a defendant . . . that there should
have been a belligerent gesture or a blow." In Britt v. Merritt 1
the court indicates that an overt act is necessary if aggression be
found.72
Pretermitting the question of whether or not an overt act
is required, certainly an overt act can be aggression, and the fol-
lowing acts have been so held: making the movement the person
would have made if he were about to draw a pistol from his
pocket, though in fact he had none, then instantly reaching out
and asking for a pistol;73 drawing a pistol and attempting to
shoot;74 drawing back a sample case and making a motion to
65. Id. at 481.
66. Munday v. Landry, 51 La. Ann. 303, 25 So. 66 (1899); Harvey v.
Harvey, 124 La. 595, 50 So. 592 (1909); McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783
(1920); Sloane v. Franchebois, 8 La. App. 395 (1928); Di Giovanni v. Brodt-
man, 128 La. 665 (La. App. 1930); Oakes v. H. Weil Baking Co., 174 La. 770,
141 So. 456 (1932); Welch v. Van Walkenburgh, 189 So. 297 (La. App. 1939);
Antley v. Davis, 199 So. 450 (La. App. 1940); Manuel v. Ardoin, 16 So. 2d 72
(La. App. 1943); Smith v. Freeman, 31 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 1947); Broussard
v. Citizen, 44 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1950); Esnault v. Richard, 53 So. 2d 494
(La. App. 1951); Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1951).
67. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
68. Id. at 503.
69. Infra p. 479.
70. 168 So. 346 (La. App. 1936).
71. 45 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1950).
72. "Anyway, the trial judge decided there was no overt act or hostile
demonstration against Merritt by Britt and we fully agree with this conclu-
sion." Id. at 906.
73. Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886).
74. Vernon v. Bankston, 28 La. Ann. 710 (1876).
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strike defendant in the' stomach;7 5 pulling up of sleeves and grab-
bing down at his pants;7 6 threatening defendant, refusing to leave
defendant's place of business and advancing on defendant;77 curs-
ing defendant and attempting to get into the small space used
as an office;78 going back into foyer and remonstrating with man-
ager.7 19 But even though there be an overt act, it must be directed
toward the other party to the altercation o in order to create
liability. Furthermore, the opposite party must have knowledge
of the overt act."'
Overt acts which were held not to be aggression include
passing an automobile on the wrong side,8 2 refusing entrance to
a bus,88 throwing wood on disputed ground,8 4 slapping defen-
dant's son,8 5 striking defendant,8 6 parking car in entrance to
parking lot and refusing to permit its removal, 7 and failing to
return a salutation.8 8
Overt acts which were clearly aggressive created no liability
when done in anticipation of aggression. Such acts were found
in placing the foot against the plaintiff's chest and shoving,
when the other party sought to come into a small space used
as an office; 9 knocking plaintiff down and continuing to punch
him after plaintiff approached defendant in a menacing attitude;0
striking plaintiff with an iron handle when plaintiff was remov-
ing a screen with intention to assault conductor; 91 hitting plaintiff
with a hatchet handle when plaintiff advanced on defendant;92
striking deceased with a "hickey" when it appeared that deceased
would have struck defendant with a conduit pipe; 8 shooting de-
ceased when deceased's companion was walking behind deceased
75. Lide v. Parker, 6 La. App. 648 (1927).
76. Welch v. Van Walkenburgh, 189 So. 297 (Ia. App. 1939).
77. Hartfield v. Thomas, 45 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 1950).
78. McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947).
79. Russo v. Orpheum Theatre and Realty Co., 136 La. 24, 66 So. 385
(1914).
80. Derouen v. Fontenot, 8 La. App. 652 (1928).
81. Ogden v. Thomas, 41 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1949).
82. Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1951).
83. Betz v. Teche Lines, 7 So. 2d 656 (La. App. 1942).
84. Capdevielle v. Christina, 3 La. App. 455 (1926).
85. Derouen v. Fontenot, 8 La. App. 652 (1928).
86. Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206, 44 L.RA. (N.S.) 604 (1913).
But here the aggressor rule itself was perverted.
87. Bacas v. Laswell, 22 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 1945).
88. Turnbow v. Wimberly, 106 La. 259, 30 So. 747 (1901).
89. McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947).
90. Di Giovanni v. Brodtman, 128 So. 665 (La. App. 1930).
91. Smith v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 127 So. 16 (La. App. 1930).
92. Sheppard v. Causey, 8 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1942).
93. Jenkins v. Cities Service Refining Corp., 44 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 1950).
1952]
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with drawn gun; 94 shooting deceased when deceased was reaching
for a loaded pistol;95 shooting plaintiff when advanced on by plain-
tiff and his brother;96 reaching for flashlight when being pursued
by a man with. a stick;9 7 striking plaintiff after plaintiff called
defendant a "robber," and stood menacingly with two compan-
ions;9 8 drawing back right hand while holding a pocket knife in it,
when defendant was approaching with a bottle in hand;99 hitting
plaintiff on the head with a beer bottle after plaintiff used provok-
ing language and otherwise made defendant apprehensive for his
safety. 0 0
WORDS' 0 1
The cases are not uniform that words do or do not constitute
aggression. Certainly words have been held to be aggression,
but the status of these decisions in particular is uncertain. The
current trend might overrule them.
In Gross v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company,02
decided in 1946, the Orleans court of appeal concluded, "As we
have said, we have found no cases which throw any real light
upon the question of what effect should be given to the fact that
insulting and abusive words are the forerunner of an affray." 103
The second circuit court of appeal seems to have been of a differ-
ent opinion one year later when it stated, "It has generally been
held by the Courts of Appeal that where the plaintiff is proven
to be the aggressor, even by the use of obscene words and highly
offensive epithets applied to the defendant, no recovery can be
had. However, cases of this character last decided by the Supreme
Court ... do not go that far." 104
Landry v. Himel 1 5 states the rule 1 6 that words constitute
aggression, and several court of appeal decisions hold to that
94. Sloane v. Franchebois, 8 La. App. 395 (1928).
95. Smith v. Haas, 9 La. App. 147 (1928).
96. Ponthieu v. Coco, 18 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1944).
97. Chisholm v. DeFrancis, 27 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 1946).
98. Massett v. Keff, 116 La. 1107, 41 So. 330 (1906).
99. Ogden v. Thomas, 41 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 1949).
100. Manuel v. Ardoin, 16 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 1943).
101. See Note, 5 LOUISIANA LAW Rvinw 617 (1944).
102. 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1946).
103. Id. at 840.
104. Starnes v. Monsour's No. 4, 30 So. 2d 135, 138 (La. App. 1947).
105. 176 So. 627 (La. App. 1937).
106. "Where a plaintiff provokes a difficulty by insults, abuse, threats or
other conduct calculated to arouse resentment or fear on the part of the
defendant, the plaintiff cannot recover for an assault and battery, although
the defendant may not have been justified in law in his conduct." Id. at 629.
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effect. Aggression was found in calling a man's wife a "G-- d---
liar";10 7 calling a cashier a thief;'08 telling a twelve year old boy
"I am going to tell the teacher on you." 109 The court in Gross v.
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company'" seemed to recognize
that words can be aggression by holding that since certain words
were not spoken, there was no aggression."' One early supreme
court decision 1 2 held that offering to fight defendant, after
attempting to fight another, and cursing, was aggression. In
Bonneval v. American Coffee Company' 13 the supreme court held
that plaintiff's words were provoked by defendant's words, and
plaintiff therefore could recover for defendant's assault on him,
thus giving the rule a new twist.
The latest expression by a court of appeal on this question
was by the second circuit in Conley v. Travelers Insurance Com-
pany:1 14 "[I]t is well established that mere words, unaccom-
panied by any physical act or even by a threat of physical vio-
lence, are insufficient to be construed as provocation justifying a
physical attack." 115 This statement is preceded by equally cate-
gorical holdings in other cases.116 No aggression was found in
plaintiff saying that he would rather believe a negro than defen-
dant's son; 117 saying "It looks like you are guilty";" s saying that
one is master of his enemies and that although one is a minor,
his pistol is of age; 119 plaintiff's calling defendant the "biggest
rascal in the whole country"; 120 calling out that he would not
"come back into the darned store any more"; 121 asking plaintiff
if he had any whiskey left; 22 ordering a boy away from in front
of defendant's place of business; 123 asking defendant "with
107. Walsh v. Schriner, 168 So. 345 (La. App. 1936).
108. Jumonville v. Frey's Inc., 173 So. 227 (La. App. 1937).
109. Graham v. McCrory, 8 La. App. 22 (1928).
110. 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 1946).
111. "The words which were spoken were obviously not seriously spoken
and neither the word 'thief' nor the word 'steal' was used." Id. at 840.
112. Hingle v. Myers, 135 La. 383, 65 So. 549 (1914).
113. 127 La. 57, 53 So. 426 (1910).
114. '53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1951).
115. Id. at 683.
116. Richardson v. Zuntz, 26 La. 313 (1874); Munday v. Landry, 51 La.
Ann. 303, 25 So. 66 (1899); Harvey v. Harvey, 124 La. 595, 50 So. 592 (1909);
Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1951).
117. Guillory v. Fontenot, 2 La. App. 189 (1925).
118. LaFleur v. Dupre, 1 La. App. 230 (1924).
119. Miller v. Meche, 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903).
120. Burnecke v. O'Neal, 139 La. 208, 71 So. 395 (1916).
121. Webb v. Rothschild, 49 La. Ann. 244, 21 So. 258 (1897).
122. Fontenot v. Tremie, 139 So. 558 (La. App. 1932).
123. Picatacci v. Palermo, 3 La. App. 465 (1926).
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warmth, by what right he had come to disturb the settlement"; 1 24
saying "If you are going to take the money by force, then do it
and get out of here";1 25 cursing defendant, 126 saying "You are a
damned liar";1 27 plaintiff's circulating rumors that defendant
was having intimate relations with plaintiff's daughter-in-law.1 28
THREATS
In Bankston v. Folks2 9 plaintiff's threats were held to have
caused the encounter and he was denied recovery. Threats were
contributory to denying plaintiff damages in Hartfield v.
Thomas.30 One may infer from the holding in Conley v. Trav-
elers Insurance Company'' that threats can be aggression, such
being affirmatively stated in Landry v. Himel.3 2 Promiscuous
threats, in Britt v. Merritt, 33 were held to be non-aggression.
STATE OF MIND
The party's state of mind at the time of encounter has been
influential in the courts, usually in denying recovery to the party
creating the special mental predisposition. Decisions expressly
recognizing the state of mind factor have considered the follow-
ing: Evidence that on two or three prior occasions the father
and daughter had engaged in a wordy controversy; 13 4 an alterca-
tion on the previous day;13 5 defendant's being informed that dece-
dent had said, as he was leaving the premises, that he was going
to get a gun; 36 deceased's drunkenly declaring that he would
kill defendant before "the moon rises before day in the morn-
ing" and deceased's aggressive acts.'3 7  Other cases 138 present
fact situations in which the courts probably were influenced by
this factor, though not expressly so.
124. Scheen v. Poland, 34 La. Ann. 1107 (1882).
125. Sheppard v. Causey, 8 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1942).
126. Randall v. Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939).
127. McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783 (1921).
128. Broussard v. Citizen, 44 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1950).
129. 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886).
130. 45 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 1950).
131. 53 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1951).
132. 176 So. 627 (La. App. 1937).
133. 45 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1950).
134. Landry v. Himel, 176 So. 627 (La. App. 1937).
135. Herrington v. Magee, 131 So. 490 (La. App. 1930).
136. Welch v. Van Walkenburgh, 189 So. 297 (La. App. 1939).
137. Esnault v. Richard, 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
138. Bankston v. Folks, 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886); Garma v. Galmiche, 130
So. 862 (La. App. 1930); Young v. Broussard, 189 So. 477 (La. App. 1939);
Healey v. Playland Amusements, 199 So. 682 (La. App. 1941); Wade v. Gen-
naro, 8 So. 2d 561 (La. App. 1942); Ponthieu v. Coco, 18 So. 2d 351 (La. App.
1944); Smith v. Freeman, 31 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 1947).
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COMMENTS
The fact that deceased likely was not fully recovered from
wounds received in an encounter seventeen days earlier with
his assailants, in Sloane v. Franchebois,139 was held to give de-
ceased a virtual license to take action when his assailants ap-
proached him.
Lack of immediate danger to defendant allowed plaintiff
recovery in LaFleur v. Dupre.140 Plaintiff was given damages in
Randall v. Ridgley141 when it was found that defendant was in
no danger of bodily harm. Conversely, in Esnault v. Richard
42
the fact that defendant was in danger of great bodily harm per-
mitted him to seek out and kill deceased without liability. In
McVay v. Ellis14 3 the doing of the act in "heat of passion" caused
a diminution of damages. Defendants' premeditation in Newsom
v. Starns144 influenced the court in awarding damages to plain-
tiff for being tarred and feathered.
INEQUALITY IN THE ENCOUNTER
Physical Capacity
There are statements in a number of the cases which indi-
cate the courts' consideration of the difference in physical capa-
city of the combatants. The following inequalities have been
noted: plaintiff was an old man, weighing about 125 pounds
and was maimed in both hands; defendant was very vigorous,
weighing about 180 or 190 pounds; 45 five years' difference be-
tween the two, the minor being about twenty years old, plaintiff
being the larger and stronger man; 46 defendant was more power-
ful than plaintiff;147 plaintiff was "an old man, 55 years of age,
sick, weak, and very feeble"; 48 defendant weighs 230 pounds, is
a strong, robust, muscular man, while plaintiff is 46 years old,
weighs 135 pounds, is a store keeper, has been in bad health,
suffering from asthma for 25 years and is a frail man; 149 "Sulli-
van's back is broken and his left leg and side are partially para-
lyzed. He is fifty years old. Plaintiff is forty-six years of age and
139. 8 La. App. 395 (1928).
140. 1 La. App. 230 (1924).
141. 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939).
142. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
143. 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783 (1921).
144. 136 So. 743 (La. App. 1931).
145. Burnecke v. O'Neal, 139 La. 208, 71 So. 395 (1916).
146. Miller v. Meche, 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903).
147. Oakes v. H. Well Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932).
148. Jumonville v. Frey's Inc., 173 So. 227 (La. App. 1937).
149. Chauvin v. Caldwell, 122 La. 709, 48 So. 159 (1909),
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is a strong vigorous man"; 15 plaintiff is about 38 years of age,
five feet ten inches tall and weighs 157 pounds, the defendant is
64 years of age;151 defendant was not of disproportionate strength
with the young man. 52 It was held in Welch v. Van Walken-
burgh'53 that the possession of a loaded and accessible pistol
"would have ably and satisfactorily offset the difference in size
that existed between him and defendant." 154
Man-Woman
Defendant who "slapped this high-tempered and disrespectful
grown daughter," after a verbal exchange, was not liable in
Landry v. Himel.15 5 Harvey v. Harvey,'5" however, held contra-
wise in the absence of the family relationship and in its stead,
a business relationship, the male defendant's slapping of the
female plaintiff made him liable though plaintiff followed and
vilified defendant. There was no recovery by the female plain-
tiff against the male defendant in Johns v. Brinker'5 7 when plain-
tiff had picked up a large lump of coal with which to strike defen-
dant.15 In Broussard v. Citizen 9 the male defendant was cast in
damages for placing his hands on female plaintiff's shoulder and
turning her toward him.
White-Negro
Johns v. Brinker6 0 was probably decided on the fact that
the suit was by a Negro against a white person, the court stating
that "Suits of this character were of somewhat frequent occur-
rence about the time this arose." 161 Other cases give less, if any,
weight to this factor.'62
150. McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947).
151. Sheppard v. Causey, 8 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 1942).
152. Hingle v. Myers, 135 La. 383, 65 So. 549 (1914).
153. 189 So. 297 (La. App. 1939).
154. Id. at 299.
155. 176 So. 627 (La. App. 1937).
156. 124 La. 595, 50 So. 592 (1909).
157. 30 La. Ann. 241 (1878).
158. But the case was decided on other grounds.
159. 44 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1950).
160. 30 La. Ann. 241 (1878).
161. Id. at 244.
162. Bernard v. Kelley, 118 La. 132, 42 So. 723 (1907) (plaintiff, Negro,
struck by defendant, white man, while plaintiff was testifying; plaintiff
recovered); Holmes v. Warren, 126 So. 259 (La. App. 1930) (Negro caddy
recovered for blow by white man golfer); Smith v. New Orleans Public
Service, 127 So. 16 (La. App. 1930) (plaintiff, Negro, denied recovery for blow
struck by white man conductor when plaintiff prepared to attack conductor);
Randall v. Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939) (plaintiff, Negro, recovered
from defendant, white man(?), when the latter shot the plaintiff.
COMMENTS
Inebriation
In Welch v. Van Walkenburgh63 the court stated that the
fact that defendant was sober and plaintiff drunk did not influ-
ence a decision favorable to plaintiff. Deceased's drunkenness
and his meanness when drunk were influential in Esnault v.
Richard.1 04 In other cases165 this factor was adverted to, but
apparently was not too important.
Reputation
The fact that defendant was a "peaceable'man" apparently
influenced the court in Hingle v. Myers; 66 a similar finding was
made in Smith v. Haas'67 and was even more decisive there.
Deceased's reputation of being a dangerous person when drunk
was partially decisive in justifying defendant's killing of deceased
in Welch v. Van Walkenburgh.68 But even though a person has
no character, or even bad character, he has a right to be let
alone.169
OTHER FACTORS AND ASPECTS
Taking the law into his own hands caused defendant to be
cast in damages in Bacas v. Laswell.1'70 Plaintiff's duty in Banks-
ton v. Folks'7' was to make an oath before an officer of the law
and have plaintiff bound over to keep the peace. In Derouen v.
Fontenot172 defendant should "have appealed to the law or the
court along the pathways of civilization for redress" 173 when
defendant saw plaintiff slap defendant's son.
a sudden break; an outburst of temper on a warm day
in August" 174 when coupled with the fact that about fifteen
white persons and forty-five Negroes were in a twenty by thirty
room, was given weight in Bernard v. Kelly.1'7 5
163. 189 So. 297 (La. App. 1939).
164. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
165. -ingle v. Myers, 135 La. 383, 65 So. 549 (1914); Young v. Broussard,
189 So. 477 (La. App. 1939); Betz v. Teche Lines, Inc., 7 So. 2d 656 (La. App.
1942); McCurdy v. City Cab Co., 32 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 1947).
166. 135 La. 383, 65 So. 549 (1914).
167. 9 La. App. 147 (1928).
168. 189 So. 297 (La. App. 1939).
169. Caspar v. Prosdame, 46 La. Ann. 36, 14 So. 317 (1894); Smith v. Free-
man, 31 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 1947).
170. 22 So. 2d 591 .(La. App. 1945).
171. 38 La. Ann. 267 (1886).
172. 8 La. App. 652 (1928).
173. Id. at 653.
174. 118 La. 132, 137, 42 So. 723, 725 (1907).
175. 118 La. 132, 42 So. 723.
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Acquittal in a criminal proceeding is not conclusive proof
that a person was not the aggressor,1 76 nor does conviction of a
crime compel civil recovery. 7 7
The intention1 78 or lack of intention 179 to start a fight is given
weight in some of the cases. But even if the act causing injury
is done in play, recovery can still be had.1 0 The use of a weapon
intended to humiliate was considered by the court in Miller v.
Meche.'81
The fact that the party makes no defense, or attempts to
escape has influenced the court in favor of that party in a number
of the cases.18 2 But in Esnault v Richard' 3 this approach was
reversed in the holding that deceased "should have . . . stayed
where he was or retreated." 184 The lack of an avenue for escape
was mentioned in one case. 8 5
The "aggressor rule" has been held to apply in workmen's
compensation suits1 86 and in suits involving a sheriff87 or town
marshal. 88
Even though one party is held to be the aggressor and is cast
in judgment, provocation by the opponent may be considered in
176. Smith v. New Orleans Public Service, 127 So. 16, 17 (La. App. 1930).
177. Ponthleu v. Coco, 18 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 1944); Britt v. Merritt, 45
So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1950).
178. Scheen v. Poland, 34 La. Ann. 1107 (1882); Chauvin v. Caldwell, 122
La. 709, 48 So. 159 (1909); Sloane v. Franchebois, 8 La. App. 395 (1928); New-
som v. Starns, 136 So. 743 (La. App. 1931); Walsh v. Schriner, 168 So. 345
(La. App. 1936); Antley v. Davis, 199 So. 450 (La. App. 1940) (though "inten-
tion" is not mentioned by the court).
179. Miller v. Meche, 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903); Britt v. Merritt, 45
So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1950).
180. Klinberg v. Grisuffl, 6 La. App. 14 (1927).
181. 111 La. 143, 35 So. 491 (1903) (a whip was used).
182. Richardson v. Zuntz, 26 La. Ann. 313 (1874) (made no defense and
tried to escape); Burnecke v. O'Neal, 139 La. 208, 71 So. 395 (1916) (plaintiff
begged to be permitted to leave the store without fighting); Oakes v. H. Wel
Baking Co., 174 La. 770, 141 So. 456 (1932) (plaintiff offered no resistance);
Beaucoudray v. Hirsch, 49 So. 2d 770 (La. App. 1951) (plaintiff tried to elude
defendant). I
183. 53 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 1951).
184. Id. at 503.
185. Sloane v. Franchebois, 8 La. App. 395 (1928).
186. Gross v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 25 So. 2d 837 (La. App.
1946).
187. Stoehr v. Payne, 132 La. 213, 61 So. 206, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 604 (1913);
Smith v. Haas, 9 La. App. 147 (1928); Britt v. Merritt, 45 So. 2d 902 (La.
App. 1950); Smith v. Clemmons, 48 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1950).
188. Espenan v. Carona, 179 So. 119 (La. App. 1938).
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mitigation of damages. s9 One case'1 0 held that enough provo-
cation offsets damages entirely, and another' 9 ' that damages were
mitigated because of the circulation of rumors by the plaintiff.
In Johns v. Brinker 92 it was held that "If the defendant was in
fault, he has, we think, been sufficiently mulcted and learned a
sufficient lesson in the progress of the multifarious and expensive
litigation which has followed." 193
William H. Parker
189. Richardson v. Zuntz, 26 La. Ann. 313 (1874); Caspar v. Prosdame, 46
La.. Ann. 36, 14 So. 317 (1894); Bernard v. Kelley, 118 La. 132, 42 So. 723 (1907);
Harvey v. Harvey, 124 La. 595, 50 So. 592 (1909); Fontenelle v. Waguespack, 150
La. 316, 90 So. 662 (1922); Capdevielle v. Christina, 3 La. App. 455 (1926);
Derouen v. Fontenot, 8 La. App. 652 (1928); Finklestein v. Naihaus, 151 So.
686 (La. App. 1933); Leaman v. Feinman, 146 So. 71 (La. App. 1933); Moore v.
Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949).
190. Manuel v. Ardoin, 16 So. 2d 72 (La. App. 1943).
191. Broussard v. Citizen, 44 So. 2d 347 (La. 'App. 1950).
192. 30 La. Ann. 241 (1878).
193. Id. at 246.
